How does euthyphro define piety

So some things are loved by some gods and hated by others. On this definition, these things will be both pious and impious, which makes no sense. Impiety is what all the gods hate. Socrates' Objection: The argument Socrates uses to criticize this definition is the heart of the dialogue. His criticism is subtle but powerful. He poses this question: Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because the gods love it? To grasp the point of the question, consider this analogous question: Is a film funny because people laugh at it or do people laugh at it because it's funny?

If we say it's funny because people laugh at it, we're saying something rather strange. We're saying that the film only has the property of being funny because certain people have a certain attitude toward it. But Socrates argues that this gets things the wrong way round. People laugh at a film because it has a certain intrinsic property, the property of being funny. This is what makes them laugh. Similarly, things aren't pious because the gods view them in a certain way.

Rather, the gods love pious actions such as helping a stranger in need, because such actions have a certain intrinsic property, the property of being pious. Socrates' Objection : The notion of care involved here is unclear. It can't be the sort of care a dog owner gives to its dog since that aims at improving the dog.

But we can't improve the gods. If it's like the care an enslaved person gives his enslaver, it must aim at some definite shared goal. But Euthyphro can't say what that goal is. Socrates' Objection : When pressed, this definition turns out to be just the third definition in disguise.

After Socrates shows how this is so, Euthyphro says in effect, "Oh dear, is that the time? Sorry, Socrates, I have to go. The Euthyphro is typical of Plato 's early dialogues: short, concerned with defining an ethical concept, and ending without a definition being agreed upon.

The question, "Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because the gods love it? It suggests a distinction between an essentialist perspective and a conventionalist perspective. Essentialists apply labels to things because they possess certain essential qualities that make them what they are. The conventionalist view is that how we regard things determines what they are.

Consider this question, for instance: Are works of art in museums because they are works of art, or do we call them "works of art" because they are in museums? Essentialists assert the first position, conventionalists the second.

Although Socrates generally gets the better of Euthyphro, some of what Euthyphro says makes a certain amount of sense. For instance, when asked what human beings can give the gods, he replies that we give them honor, reverence, and gratitude. Some philosophers argue that this is a pretty good answer. This is where Socrates begins his dialogue with Euthyphro seeking the definition of piety.

Socrates wants Euthyphro to teach him the meaning of piety since Euthyphro considers himself an authority on the subject. In this dialogue Euthyphro gives Socrates four different definitions of what he believes piety is, none of which prove satisfactory to Socrates, leaving the question unanswered in the end. This is merely an example of piety, and Socrates is seeking a definition, not one or two pious actions. He does not want to know which things or actions are pious, but rather what piety itself is.

One cannot simply define something by giving examples so this definition does not satisfy Socrates. Euthyphro gives Socrates the second definition. Therefore piety is determined by the gods. According to this argument, this cannot be true because, how can all the gods find everything to be pious when what is just to some gods is unjust to others, and what one god finds beautiful another would not.

They have differences in opinion. This is a good argument in that, the gods would not agree on piety, therefore piety cannot be simply what is dear to the gods. It must be something else. Euthyphro believes that for man to be pious to the gods he must learn to do what is pleasing to the gods.

Taking care of the gods is doing service for the gods. The horse breeder takes care of his horses, the cattle raiser cares for his cattle, and the slave takes care of his master. These are all pious actions intended to please the gods. This definition seems to lead to the idea that sacrifice and prayer will get a man what he wants from the gods, as long as it is considered pious by the gods.

The fourth definition brings us full circle, and back to where they started leaving the question unanswered. Piety is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them. And so according to this definition, it would seem that some acts are both pious and impious. But since piety and impiety are opposites , it would seem that no act should be both at once.

And so this definition appears to lead to a contradiction. Note: Socrates also notes that we are told the gods have much the same kinds of disagreements that Euthyphro has with his family pp. So appealing to the gods offers little help. Note further: Although Socrates says a little about the difficulty determining just what the gods might like or dislike p.

Piety is what all the gods love; impiety is what they all hate. Instead, this definition only identifies an attribute or effect of piety.