Why was chancellorsville lees greatest victory

Jackson takes nearly 30, men off on a march that clandestinely crosses the front of the enemy army and swings around behind it. That leaves Lee with only about 15, men to hold off Hooker's army around the Chancellorsville crossroads. He skillfully manages the formidable task by feigning attacks with a thin line of skirmishers. At about p. Jackson, having completed his circuit around the enemy, unleashes his men in a violent attack on Hooker's right and rear.

Yet three hours later, the army suffers a nadir as low as the afternoon's zenith, when Jackson falls, mortally wounded by the fire of his own men. Stuart is now in temporary command. Both sides settle in for an anxious night, with pickets occasionally exchanging musket fire in the dark.

May 3. The long marches and daring tactics of the last two days give way to a slugging match in the impenetrable woods on three sides of Chancellorsville intersection. The fighting is intense and the casualties mount on both sides. Hooker abandons key ground in a further display of timidity. Confederate artillery roars from Hazel Grove, and Southern infantry doggedly pushes ahead.

When a Confederate artillery round smashes into a pillar against which Hooker leans, the Federal leader is knocked unconscious for a half hour.

His return to semi-sentience disappoints the veteran corps commanders who had hoped that without him they would be free to employ their army's considerable untapped might. By mid-morning, Southern infantry smashes through the final resistance and unites in the Chancellorsville clearing. Their boisterous, well-earned, celebration does not last long.

May 4. McLaws and Early counterattack Sedgwick and push him back across the river, halting the Union threat from the east. May 5. Hooker holds a council of war with his corps commanders, who want to continue the fight. Have these brave comrades who have fought so bravely and died at their post died in vain? Confederate cartographer Jedediah Hochkiss, who was taking measurements in the area for a map of the campaign, records in his journal on May 12, , that he "had no idea the enemy were so well fortified and wonder they left their works so soon.

In the wake of Second Manassas, where Lee was outnumbered just as he was at Chancellorsville though not as badly , he firmly held the initiative in his hand. With it, he continued to press his demoralized foe as it streamed panic stricken back towards Washington City. When it appeared the campaign might stalemate against the mounds of earthen fortifications ringing the capital city, Lee chose another option, always remembering that with the initiative in your hand, you never let it slip from your grasp.

First, Washington City may never have been more ripe for the taking than it was at the end of August Two exhausted Federal armies and thousands of recently mustered in recruits defended the city, but people within its defenses questioned if this would even matter. The European powers monitoring events from across the pond also seemed closer to taking the leap and supervising a mediation between the Union and Confederacy than it ever had before or since.

While Lee could not have known the true extent of all of this, he and his men were well aware of the achievements they gained for their country. And, if you are looking for the trees amidst the forest, Lee did achieve at Second Manassas something that he could not do during the rest of his stint in command — destroy a Federal army. The Army of Virginia never fought another battle following its defeat at the hands of Robert E.

The War Department terminated it on September 12, and its shattered remnants folded into the command structure of the Army of the Potomac. Nit picky? A great victory, Second Bull Run, but as indecisive as Chancellorsville. Yet bereft of results. There was need for inspired strategy as well as a brilliant demonstration of operational and tactical skill by Lee and his wing commanders.

Very well put! The more one studies the War in the West you realize how much talent and manpower was wasted by lack of coordination. I respectfully disagree on Bragg. The answer probably depends on the measuring stick. As a tactical victory, Chancellorsville would seem to win out.

As a strategic matter, for the reasons discussed it would be Second Bull Run. And yet, it directly led IMO to his defeat at Gettysburg. Lee drew the wrong lesson from Chancellorsville—he believed his army had defeated the Union army, and therefore was capable of great feats.

On April 27, , after putting two-thirds of his forces in front of Fredericksburg to feign a frontal assault, Hooker led the other third of his Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock River. He hoped to come up behind Confederate trenches near Fredericksburg and catch the enemy by surprise.

Lee, too, divided his force, retaining 10, troops led by Jubal Early to hold Fredericksburg before marching the rest of his army West to meet Hooker head-on.

The two armies clashed in an open field just beyond the Wilderness, a forest west of Chancellorsville, on May 1, Despite his superior numbers, Hooker had his men fall back to defensive positions, opening the door for Lee to hatch the most brilliant offensive plan of his career.

Lee split his army again, sending his right-hand man Thomas J. As the sun set, Jackson led his men to scout ahead in the forest. A North Carolina regiment opened fire, mistaking them for enemy cavalry.

A bullet struck Jackson, shattering the bone above his left shoulder. General J. Jackson died from pneumonia on May 10, They suffered at least 2, casualties. Later that evening, however, General Stonewall Jackson was mistaken for Union cavalry and was shot in the arm as he rode out to investigate the feasibility of launching a nighttime attack on the Federals.

Jackson contracted pneumonia and died on May 10th. Jackson's death was devastating to the Confederate cause and to Lee's battle strategies through the remainder of the war. Hooker's Incompetence Despite the initial setback, Union forces were still in control. Nearly 76, Union soldiers were still in positions defending Chancellorsville compared to 43, soldiers available to the Confederacy. The two largest parts of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia were positioned on either side of Union forces that occupied an area of high ground known as Hazel's Grove.

Luckily for the Confederacy, General Hooker ordered those soldiers, under the command of General Sickles, to a different position on a local road called the Plank Road.