Why lee lost gettysburg

Everything — perhaps the entire Civil War — depended on the outcome at Gettysburg. Despite his relatively good medical condition from to , by the end of the decade, he suffered from exertional stable angina — chest pain from blocked arteries caused by activity. By , his angina became unstable and he died at age Meanwhile, the Confederates divided their forces and investigated various targets, such as Harrisburg, the Pennsylvania capital.

Lee ordered his army to concentrate in the vicinity of the crossroads town of Gettysburg and prepare to meet the Federal army. At the same time, Meade sent ahead part of his force into Pennsylvania but intended to make a stand at Pipe Creek in Maryland.

On July 1, a Confederate division under General Henry Heth marched into Gettysburg hoping to seize supplies but finding instead three brigades of Union cavalry.

Thus began the Battle of Gettysburg, and Lee and Meade ordered their massive armies to converge on the impromptu battle site. The Union cavalrymen defiantly held the field against overwhelming numbers until the arrival of Federal reinforcements. Later, the Confederates were reinforced, and by mid-afternoon some 19, Federals faced 24, Confederates.

Lee arrived to the battlefield soon afterward and ordered a general advance that forced the Union line back to Cemetery Hill, just south of the town. On July 2, against the Union left, General James Longstreet led the main Confederate attack, but it was not carried out until about 4 p. Thus began some of the heaviest fighting of the battle, and Union forces retained control of their strategic positions at heavy cost.

After three hours, the battle ended, and the total number of dead at Gettysburg stood in the thousands. A 15,man strong column under General George Pickett was organized, and Lee ordered a massive bombardment of the Union positions.

The 10, Federals answered the Confederate artillery onslaught, and for more than an hour the guns raged in the heaviest cannonade of the Civil War.

Only a few hundred Virginians reached the Union line, and within minutes they all were dead, dying, or captured.

They attempted to maintain their perfect parade order, but all hell broke loose when short-range round shot from Federal cannon exploded along the entire ridgeline—from Cemetery Hill on the north to Little Round Top on the south. The slaughter was indescribably horrible, but the courageous rebels closed ranks and marched on. Taking tremendous losses, they started up the final rise toward the copse that was their goal, all the while viciously assaulted from the front, from both flanks, and even from their rear.

The rifle fire from Brigadier General George J. Soon the numbers of the attackers dwindled to insignificance. The survivors let loose their rebel yell and charged the trees near the center of Cemetery Ridge. General Lewis Armistead led men in the final surge across the low stone wall, where he fell mortally wounded.

The rest were killed, wounded, or captured within minutes. Seventeen hundred yards away, Lee watched his gray and butternut troops disappear into the all-engulfing smoke on the ridge and then saw some of them emerge in retreat.

Fewer than seven thousand of the original thirteen thousand returned to Seminary Ridge. Lee and Longstreet tried to console Pickett, who was distraught over the slaughter of his men.

More than a thousand of those rebel casualties were killed—all in a thirty-minute bloodbath. Brigadier General Richard Garnett, whose five Virginia regiments led the assault, was killed, and of his 1, men were killed or wounded.

That night Lee rode alone among his troops. Time was his greatest enemy now. Based on what he heard, he believed the Federal line stretched south along the Emmitsburg Road for a relatively short distance, terminating near or at a peach orchard. On July 1, Lee had allowed less than half his army to become engaged without being able to control the fight or complete the victory.

Unfortunately for Rebel arms, his conclusions stemmed from bad information and his own overoptimistic assumptions. Lee believed that the Army of the Potomac was still in the process of reaching Gettysburg when, in fact, much of it including its commander, Maj. George G. Meade had arrived or was very close by. He imagined that the Federals were dispirited and demoralized when in reality their fighting spirit was at a fever pitch.

The enemy position sketched for him was wrong in several important ways. Instead of running along the course of the Emmitsburg Road, the Union forces followed the actual ridgeline, which diverged to the east before terminating at a low hill Little Round Top , rather than hanging in the air at the Peach Orchard. The army Lee was sending into battle at Gettysburg had been patched together in record time.

In the short period between receiving permission for the operation and actually beginning it, he had reorganized it from top to bottom. A two-corps force had become a three-corps arrangement, with new officers put in charge at all levels. There had not been time to road test any of the parts and Lee chose to ignore that critical stage of army building. Greatly worried that bad news from Vicksburg would renew calls to disperse portions of his command, he had set off on his most critical campaign of the war with an army whose command-and-control elements had yet to jell.

July 2 at Gettysburg would subject this construct to maximum stress. It would seem that with Stuart still absent, there was no one other than Lee himself charged with gathering field intelligence. Longstreet emerged from a lengthy, circuitous route chosen to avoid detection to find the enemy not just in the Peach Orchard, but positioned farther back to enfilade the flank of any force moving north along the Emmitsburg Road.

It took skill and experience to know when a demonstration should be converted into an attack. Some brigades advanced in conjunction with a movement to their immediate right, others held back waiting to be called up to support the neighboring advance, while at least one refrained from moving at all. Any cumulative assault power was dissipated as a result, and countless acts of valor wasted. Communication was no better with the opposite flank. On the far left, Richard Ewell acted with little regard for what was taking place elsewhere on July 2.

This despite a personal visit from Lee in the morning, as Longstreet was preparing for his flank march. According to a recent biography of Ewell, nothing is known of his activities this afternoon. His artillery provided some help. For a short period the Rebel cannoneers gave as good as they got, but the heavier weight of the Federal counterbattery fire soon exacted a high price from the Rebel gunners. Then, around p. The former effort grabbed some empty trenches on the lower slope, while the latter was hurled back after fierce fighting.

Lee, posted near the physical center of the action, was curiously detached from the combat. The other two sent surrogates with summaries that failed to convey a complete picture of their circumstances. Perhaps that in itself should have made it clear that Longstreet and Ewell had their hands full.

However, already lining up his sights on July 3, Lee did not read anything into the absence of the two officers whose personal observations should have shaped his planning. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed….

Edward P. Alexander, had learned firsthand late on the afternoon of July 2, the ground rose again some 40 feet at the Federal main line of resistance, so packing the Peach Orchard with Confederate cannons provided none of the advantages Lee imagined.

Having composed a picture of an enemy army on the ropes, and buoyed by his faith in his men, he determined to press ahead. The general plan was unchanged. Also receiving orders was Jeb Stuart, who had reached the battlefield at some point in the afternoon of July 2, well ahead of his troopers, who would not be available for any serious work that day. Despite what Lee and Stuart believed, the Union forces were already moving north when the operation began, forcing the Rebel riders on a wide detour to reach an unguarded Potomac ford.

The chance capture of a U. He lost valuable time paroling Yankee teamsters and guards, and was then burdened by attaching the slow-moving wagons to his column.